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How Does Ownership Structure Affect Capital Structure 
and Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from East Asia  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Asian Crisis of the late 1990s has highlighted the problems of corporate 
governance among South East Asian corporations. Of particular concern are 
concentrated ownership, dominance of controlling shareholders, separation of voting 
and cash flow rights and limited protection of minority rights, these problems being 
particularly acute in the countries badly affected by the Crisis (Claessens et al., 2000). 
While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm 
valuation (e.g., see Claessens et al. 2002), the relationship between ownership 
structure and capital structure remains much unexplored, especially in East Asia.1 It is 
however important to understand the effects of ownership structure on capital 
structure, particularly in the context of over-investment and over-borrowing among 
East Asian corporations during the last crisis. Furthermore, prior studies (e.g., 
McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Berger and di Patti, 2003) have highlighted the link 
between firm value and capital structure that remains much unexplored. The present 
study thus integrates these various strands of the literature and examines the effects of 
ownership structure on both capital structure and firm value (after allowing for the 
possible simultaneity between capital structure and firm value). The analysis is done 
for the four countries, worst affected by the crisis, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand and highlights the different mechanisms of control and management 
between family and non-family firms. These results not only confirm some of the key 
findings of Claessens et al. (2002), e.g., significance of the separation of ownership 
                                                
1
 Brailsford et al. (2002) however study the effects of external block ownership and managerial share 
ownership on capital structure among the US firms. 
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(i.e., cash flow rights) from control rights, but also extend the latter by distinguishing 
ownership from management among family and non-family firms, and also 
highlighting the differences in results among the sample countries. 
Conflict of interests between managers and shareholders as well as between 
controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance 
literature. This literature however fails to produce any conclusive evidence on the 
relationship between ownership structure, capital structure and firm value/efficiency. 
The following section reviews various strands of this literature with a view to 
identifying the possible ways ownership could affect capital structure and firm 
valuation.  
Effects on capital structure: First external block-holders may reduce the scope 
of managerial opportunism resulting in lower direct agency conflicts between 
management and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). If external block-holders 
serve as active monitors, management may not be able to adjust debt to their own 
interests as freely if such investors do not exist. In other words, firms with higher 
external block-holding are likely to have a higher debt ratio. Second, managerial self-
interests in continued viability of the firm may also be important in inducing 
managers to lower debt. This is because large debt increases the risks of bankruptcy. 
Third, corporate debt policy has also been viewed as an internal control mechanism 
that may lower agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, especially in the 
presence of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) in addition 
argue that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume 
perquisites, expropriate shareholders’ wealth and to engage in other non-maximising 
behaviour and thus helps in aligning the interests of management with those of the 
shareholders. Fourth, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Demsetz (1983) insisted that 
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managerial share-ownership may still have adverse effects on agency conflicts. The 
latter may in fact entrench the incumbent management leading to an increase in 
managerial opportunism. In addition, Brailsford et al. (2002) suggest that the 
relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage may in fact be non-
linear: At low level of managerial ownership, agency conflicts fall leading to higher 
debt and capital structure. However, when managers already hold a significant portion 
of firms’ equity, an increase in managerial ownership may lead to an increase in 
managerial opportunism and therefore may cause lower debt.  
Effects on firm valuation: The link between ownership structure and firm 
value/performance/efficiency has been the subject of an on-going debate going back 
to Berle and Means (1932), who suggested that firms with a wide dispersal of shares 
tend to under-perform. In general, a positive relation between ownership 
concentration and firm efficiency is predicted and many studies have confirmed this 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Short, 1994; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Thomsen & 
Pederson, 2000; Gorton & Schmidt, 1996; Kang and Shivadasani, 1995). Further, 
Stulz (1988) formalised a concave relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm valuation: an increase in managerial ownership and control will first increase 
firm value; but at a higher level of managerial ownership, firm value will decrease 
because of entrenchment effects. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) however argued that 
concentration is endogenous to value and therefore has no effect. Much of this 
variation in these results may however be attributable to the difficulties in obtaining a 
uniform measure of firm performance, firm value or efficiency.  
Existing empirical literature is however largely based on the functioning of the 
US firms generally characterised by a wide dispersion in ownership structure than one 
  5
finds in SE Asian countries.2 A couple of recent studies by Claessens et al. (2000, 
2002) however highlighted the distinctive pattern of ownership structure in East Asia. 
East Asian corporations are often dominated by large family owners and are 
characterised by concentration of ownership as well as the presence of a Cronyman; 
the latter is a special case where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Board Chairman 
or Vice Chairman is also a controlling shareholder of the company. In other words, 
firms with a Cronyman come closest to the owner-managed firms in the literature.  
Ownership structures are also characterised by the separation of voting rights 
from cash flow rights where control rights (or voting rights) of the largest owners 
were often generally greater than the corresponding cash flow rights. Higher voting 
rights may give rise to serious agency problems, and are often associated with 
pyramid ownership structures, and crossholding. Such situations are associated with 
an over-reliance on debt, due to large shareholders being unwilling to dilute their 
ownership. This is known as non-dilution of entrenchment (Claessens et al., 2002).  
In this context, it is also important to distinguish family firms from other non-
family firms,3 as it would help one to disentangle the complex relationship between 
ownership structures on the one hand and capital structure and firm valuation on the 
other. Family controlled firms in East Asia often have a large controlling shareholder 
with a fringe of small shareholders so that the classic agency problem between 
managers and shareholders is mitigated here. Thus the controlling shareholder has the 
interests to monitor the manager, which in turn may increase firm value by 
                                                
2
 Recent evidence however tends to highlight a substantial degree of ownership concentration including 
family ownership in large firms around the world (e.g., see, Morck et al., 2005). Such arguments are 
supported by large scale studies such as La Porta et al. (1999) as well.  
3
 In our sample non-family firms include both state owned and other widely held firms. While 
Claessens et al. (2002) conduct separate analysis for the state-owned firms for their pooled data of all 
countries taken together, there is insufficient observations in our case for separately analysing the 
behaviour of state-owned firms for each country using more complex 3SLS estimates with error 
components. 
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minimising managerial opportunism. Controlling shareholders may however still 
expropriate minority shareholders, thus destroying the firm value somewhat. There is 
also some literature (e.g., see Daly and Dollinger, 1992) to suggest that owner 
managed family firms are more risk-averse even at the highest level of concentration. 
The latter may in turn challenge the conventional wisdom of the positive effects of 
concentration on capital structure and firm value among family firms.  
Non-family firms in contrast tend to have more dispersed ownership so that 
the expropriation of minority shareholders is less of an issue, while the classic conflict 
of interests between managers and shareholders remains pertinent. There are various 
ways of disciplining managers in non-family firms, including direct monitoring by the 
Board of Directors (despite CEO’s power) and also indirectly by tying managerial 
rewards to firm performance, rules concerning CEO appointment and tenure. These 
direct and indirect rules may motivate the management to implement successful 
strategic decisions and prevent CEO entrenchment. Family firms in contrast rely on 
rather informal process of monitoring because family owners often have intimate 
relationship with the management (e.g., via the presence of a Cronyman in owner-
managed firms); in other words, personal relations with the management in family 
firms embody governance mechanisms. It is also possible for the family firms to align 
the interests of the managers with those of the family not only in a given generation, 
but also across generations.    
The above considerations suggest that effects of ownership on leverage and 
firm value will vary between owner-managed family and other non-family firms, 
possibly even to the extent of working in different directions.  For example, for family 
firms, especially the owner-managed ones  (i.e., those with a Cronyman), higher 
concentration and incentive effects may have positive effects on both capital structure 
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and firm value, while entrenchment effects (against minority shareholders) may 
increase leverage but lower firm value. Equally risk aversion may lower leverage 
(below the optimal) as well as firm value. Thus the total effect could be positive or 
negative. In non-family firms, especially which are not owner-managed, in contrast, 
the relationship between ownership, leverage and firm value will depend primarily on 
the ability of the firm to minimise managerial opportunism by formal monitoring. 
Entrenchment and risk-aversion effects, if any, are likely to be small. If the 
monitoring mechanism works, the net effect could be lower leverage but higher firm 
value. 
It thus follows that any attempt to disentangle the complex effects of 
ownership on capital structure and firm valuation in East Asia requires the 
identification of family/other firms with respect to ownership, control and 
management. Although our analysis builds on Claessens et al. (2002) and retains the 
separation of cash flow rights (i.e., ownership) from control (i.e., voting) rights, we 
extend Claessens et al. (2002) in a number of ways. First, we examine the effects of 
ownership on both firm value and capital structure; in doing so, we also allow for the 
simultaneity between capital structure and firm valuation which in turn justify the 
joint determination of capital structure and firm performance in a sample of four 
countries badly affected by the recent crisis. We believe that the introduction of 
capital structure in this framework is particularly important for the worst affected East 
Asian firms during the recent crisis. This is because over-borrowing and over-
investment have been identified as one major cause of the crisis, though its link to 
ownership structure remains much unexplored in the existing literature. Second, 
unlike Claessens et al. (2002), we separate ownership from management, using the 
‘Cronyman’ variable (where the CEO, Board Chairman or Vice Chairman is also a 
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controlling owner). In particular, our analysis focuses on a distinction between (a) 
family firms with a Cronyman and (b) non-family firms without a Cronyman.4 This 
embodies a crucial distinction between family and non-family firms that remains 
much unexplored in the literature. Finally, our analysis looks at individual countries 
rather than pooling them together as in Claessens et al. (2002). Results highlight the 
differences between the sample countries, thus making a case for studying them 
separately.  
The paper focuses on four countries worst affected by the crisis, namely, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. These countries offer interesting 
similarities and differences: while family firms dominate in all these countries, 
ownership concentration is relatively less in Malaysia and Thailand; also these 
countries are at different stages of capital market development (e.g., see Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 1995). This comparative analysis could thus potentially yield differing 
impacts of ownership, control and management on capital structure and firm valuation 
in the sample countries.5  
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 presents the data and discusses 
its characteristic features, highlighting the differences in ownership, control and 
management on capital structure and firm valuation in four East Asian countries, 
badly affected by the crisis. Section 3 builds up the methodology and analyses the 
results.  The final section concludes.  
 
                                                
4
 Note that this is a useful classification in our context because a majority of family firms tend to have a 
Cronyman while a majority of a non-family firms do not. Thus there are insufficient observations for us 
to do meaningful analysis for family firms without a Cronyman and non-family firms with a 
Cronyman. Note that Claessens et al. (2002) distinguishes family firms from state-owned and other 
widely held firms. We however find that there are insufficient observations to do separate regressions 
for individual categories of firms and produce robust 3SLS estimates.   
5
 Note, however, that we did not have enough observations (after merging Worldscope data with 
ownership data) to analyse the cases of firms in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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2.  DATA AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
We examine the effects of ownership structure on capital structure and firm value 
among listed non-financial companies in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. 
Data used for this analysis come from two sources. Firm-level accounting data for the 
period 1994-98 extracted from Worldscope is matched with 1996 ownership data for 
these firms described in Claessens et al. (2002).6 La Porta et al (1999) demonstrate 
that ownership structures in these firms are very stable over time7; thus without much 
loss of generality we assume that ownership pattern remained more or less stable 
among sample firms over the period 1994-1998, before the post-crisis restructuring 
programmes came into operation.  
 
2.1. Characterisation of Ownership Structure 
The differences in ownership structures among firms in these countries are illustrated 
in Table 1A and Table 1B.  
 As is well documented, family ownership is the predominant form of 
ownership in most of these sample countries: 75% of Indonesian firms, 79% of 
Korean firms and 76% of Malaysian firms in our samples were family owned; the 
corresponding proportion was 61% for Thai firms. The rest of the firms were state 
owned, (e.g., Indonesia: 8%; Korea: 5%) or labelled as widely held corporations.  
Secondly, management is rarely separated from ownership, especially among 
family firms in these countries. This is characterised by the presence of a Cronyman 
where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Board Chairman or Vice-chairman was 
                                                
6
 We also tried to include firms in Singapore and Hong Kong as the comparator countries; however 
there were insufficient observations in the merged files for these two countries; as a result we were 
unable to perform the 3SLS estimates for these countries. 
7
 Bajaj et al. (1998) too assume ownership structure to be given exogenously. 
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also a controlling owner. Information on the presence of a Cronyman is available in 
the data constructed by Claessens et al. (2002). Presence of a Cronyman was noted in 
as high as 85% or more family firms in all the sample countries. In contrast, presence 
of a Cronyman was rather uncommon among non-family firms in all the sample 
countries.  
The separation of cash flow rights (i.e., ownership) from control (i.e., voting) 
rights is another important feature of East Asian corporations, especially those owned 
by families. This measured by a binary variable CEC that takes a value 1 if control or 
voting rights exceed cash flow rights. In particular, control rights exceed cash flow 
rights among nearly 90% or more family firms in all the sample countries. More 
interestingly, we observe a close association between presence of a Cronyman and 
higher voting than cash flow rights in the sample countries: more than 90% of 
Cronyman firms in Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia exhibit voting rights in excess of 
cash flow rights (the corresponding proportion for Thai firms was around 67%) 
though. In contrast, the proportion varied between 6-11% among other non-family 
firms in the sample countries (see Table 1).   
 Ownership concentration is often the most common measure of ownership in 
the literature. The distribution of concentration of ownership among top five 
shareholders clearly varies among the sample countries. The proportion of total firms 
with concentration greater than 50% was 47 in Indonesia, 6 in Korea and none in 
Malaysia and Thailand. Equally, in just around half the Indonesian and Korean firms, 
the top five shareholders account for 25-50% of holdings; the corresponding 
proportions were 16% and 23% for Malaysian and Thai firms. While in only 3% of 
Indonesian firms do the top five shareholders account for less than 25% of the equity, 
the figures are as high as 84% and 77% respectively for Malaysian and Thai firms; in 
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other words, level of concentration is significantly less in Malaysian and Thai firms in 
our samples.  
We also experiment with cash flow rights of the largest shareholder as an 
alternative index of ownership.8 Average cash flow rights of the largest owner varied 
between 51-58% in the sample countries. We however do not find any significant 
difference  in this respect between  family and other firms in our samples.  
 
2.2. Effects of Ownership on Capital Structure and Firm Valuation 
We started with two possible indicators of capital structure, namely, debt-equity ratio, 
defined as total debt divided by book value of common equity, and a ratio of total debt 
to total assets. Given that debt-equity ratios could be negative in some cases when 
firms exhibit negative values of equity, we choose to use total debt to total assets as 
the relevant measure of capital structure in our analysis. Table 2 illustrates the average 
leverage among sample firms with different structures of ownership, control and 
management during 1994-98. We consider two sub-periods, namely, 1994-96 (pre-
crisis period) and 1997-98 (crisis period). Compared with Indonesia and Malaysia, 
firms in Korea and Thailand relied on particularly high leverage even in the pre-crisis 
period. Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic (1995) suggest that the over-reliance on debt 
in the worst affected countries, especially Korea, can be partially explained by the 
relatively low levels of stock market development in the country. The relationship 
between concentration and average leverage is not monotonic and it also varies 
among the sample countries. Average leverage is higher among firms with higher 
concentration (concentration>25%). Average leverage is generally higher among 
                                                
8
 Final Tables (see Appendix 1) present the estimates using concentration as the relevant measure of 
ownership. In an alternative specification, we also present 3SLS estimates using cash flow ownership 
(see Appendix 2). 
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family firms in Indonesia and Korea. Presence of a Cronyman however had 
significant impact on leverage in Indonesia and Malaysia particularly. While higher 
control than cash flow rights did not make a significant difference in average leverage 
in the pre-crisis period, the difference became significant during the crisis period, 
especially in Indonesia and Thailand. Average leverage increases significantly during 
the crisis years for all different categories of ownership, control and management.  
  Our indicator of firm value is Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the firm’s market 
value as a proportion of total assets. Table 2 shows the average levels of Q associated 
with different types of ownership structure during the pre-crisis (1994-96) and the 
crisis (1997-98) years. The data show a general deterioration of firm valuation during 
the crisis period. Average Q is generally higher among firms with greater 
concentration, especially in Korea and Indonesia. Effects of family ownership or 
presence of Cronyman on Q is however not so obvious here and may work in either 
direction; if at all, the effect seems to be small.  
 
  
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our discussion in sections 1 and 2 summarises the distinctive characteristics of 
ownership structure in East Asian corporations, which in turn highlights the 
importance of identifying the ownership of family and non-family firms separately, 
with respect to control and management. In doing so, we particularly focus on family 
firms with Cronyman and non-family firms without Cronyman and analyse the effects 
of ownership (i.e., concentration as well as separation of ownership from control) on 
capital structure and firm value, taking account of their respective simultaneity. 
While there are variations in ownership structures across firms, following La 
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Porta et al. (1999) and Bajaj et al. (1998), we consider these to be stable over the 
period of our analysis (at least before the post-crisis restructuring programmes were 
launched). We thus have a sample of panel nature for the period 1994-98 where most 
firm-level variables tend to vary over time while ownership variables remain time-
invariant.  
We do not directly observe the managerial shareholding in our data, but 
capture the presence of a controlling manager through the variable labelled as 
Cronyman in the ownership data a la Claessens et al. (2002). A high correlation 
between the presence of a Cronyman and family ownership in our samples may 
indicate a close correlation between owner and managers of a family firm. As 
indicated earlier, the latter could play an important role in affecting leverage and firm 
value of sample firms. In order to address this issue, our analysis distinguishes 
between family firms with Cronyman and non-family firms without Cronyman;9 the 
latter may characterise the differential nature of control and management in family (as 
opposed to non-family) firms.  
Thirdly, the existing literature suggests efforts to minimise managerial 
opportunism/moral hazard plays an important role as to how ownership structure 
could affect capital structure and firm valuation. While this is ensured through 
informal mechanism in family firms, especially the owner managed ones (e.g., 
personal relationship between owner and manager in Cronyman firms), formal 
monitoring of a more direct nature plays an important role in limiting managerial 
opportunism in non-family firms. It is however difficult to find an appropriate and 
truly exogenous measure of the degree of monitoring. Various proxies have been used 
in the existing literature, e.g., percentage of outside directors (Mehran, 1992), 
                                                
9
 There is however insufficient number of observations to conduct the analysis for family firms without 
a Cronyman and non-family firms with a Cronyman. 
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shareholder voting rights (Lippert and Moore, 1994) or control potential (e.g., 
measured by institutional ownership, as in Mehran, 1995). Since we do not observe 
these proxies used in the literature , we generate a number of binary variables  related 
to  the separation of control rights from cash flow rights as possible measures of 
managerial opportunism. These may include control minus cash-flow rights (CMC) 
and also control exceeds cash-flow rights (CEC) of the largest owner. We generate a 
third variable that takes a value 1 if control rights of the largest owner are higher than 
cash-flow rights and if this separation is higher than the median separation in corporations 
where control and ownership differ (CECHIGH). Inclusion of both CEC and CECHIGH 
would allow us to capture non-monotonicity in the relationship, if any.10 When a large 
shareholder keeps significant control rights with relatively small cash flow rights, s/he 
has little stake in firm value and can get away despite taking reckless policies (e.g., 
over-borrowing) undermining the interests of the minority shareholders. Thus in this 
case market forces such as the product market (Hart 1983) or the corporate control 
market (Stulz 1988) may fail to discipline the controlling shareholder towards firm 
value maximisation.  
A higher level of ownership (cash flow rights) concentration may also be an 
indication of an environment where it is costly to conduct control-related activities. 
Thus the level of ownership concentration among the top 5 shareholders (CONCEN) 
could also indirectly account for the lack of monitoring of the activities of minority of 
controlling shareholders.  
It would also be interesting to analyse the differential effects of these moral 
hazard variables (e.g., CEC and CECHIGH) in family firms with Cronyman and non-
family firms without Cronyman. In particular, while CEC and CECHIGH could be 
                                                
10
 In an alternative specification we also include CMC and the results are comparable to when we 
include CEC and CECHIGH though the latter were more robust. Hence we decided to present these 
results only. 
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significant for family firms relying on informal relationship, these may turn out to be 
insignificant for non-family firms (especially those without a Cronyman) relying more 
on formal monitoring mechanisms, ; the latter would constitute an indirect test of 
differential monitoring mechanism among non-family firms.  
 
3.1. Empirical Relationships 
Having discussed the analytical and measurement issues, we shall in this section 
specify the empirical relationships of our interest.  
Ownership and Capital Structure 
We experimented with different combinations of ownership variables and also with 
different threshold points for the ownership concentration variables to capture non-
linearity. Equation 1 turns out to be the most parsimonious specification for 
determining leverage in terms of ownership structure. Thus the relationship between 
ownership structure and capital structure (DA) for firm i in year t is given as follows:  
)1(%)50()( 11543210 ititiiiiit uXCECHIGHCECConcenConcenDA ++++>++= αααααα
 
Here X1it refer to other possible control variables (see discussion later in this section) 
and the residual error term is u1it. As is evident, our specification closely follows 
Claessens et al. (2002); this is done with a view to facilitate comparison of our results 
with those of Claessens et al. (2002). The discussion below also demonstrates the 
extensions that we offer to previous work, including the family/ non-family 
distinction, and the simultaneity between leverage and firm value.  
 
Ownership and Firm Performance 
Firm valuation (Q) in our analysis is measured by Tobin’s q (see discussion in section 
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2) and is determined as follows:  
)2( %)50()( 22543210 ititiiiiit uXCECHIGHCECConcenConcenQ ++++>++= ββββββ  
Equation 2 is also the most parsimonious valuation function that we had identified 
after testing of alternatives against one another. Here X2it captures all other possible 
factors and u2it are the residual error term (see section 4.1.3. below). 
 
Other Explanatory Variables 
In addition to indicators of ownership structure, we include a number of other firm-
specific control variables commonly used in existing studies.  
Firm size: Firm size is measured by log of total sales. Firm size may be 
positively (Friend and Lang, 1988; Marsh, 1982) or negatively (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995) related to leverage. Large firms may exercise economies of scale, have better 
knowledge of markets and are able to employ better managers. Large size may enable 
greater specialisation. It may also measure a firm's market power or the level of 
concentration in the industry. Large firms can however be less efficient than smaller 
ones, because of the loss of control by top managers over strategic and operational 
activities (Himmelberg et. al 1999, Williamson 1967). Also as Jensen (1986) notes 
professional managers of a firm (who are not the owners) derive personal benefits 
from expanding beyond the optimal size of the firm by their desire to have, among 
others, power and status. The latter may increase leverage and lower firm efficiency. 
Age of the firm: Firm performance may depend on the accumulated 
knowledge about the market, experience and firm’s reputation. Hence, one would 
expect a positive relationship between firm age (measured in years since 
establishment) and firm valuation. Old firms however, may be less open to new 
technology as well as more rigid in terms of style and effectiveness of managerial 
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governance. This may result in a negative relation between the age and performance 
of the firm. As for capital structure, old firms, particularly in East Asian countries, are 
likely to have developed close links with their lenders and hence may be able to 
acquire debt more easily and at a cheaper rate, resulting in a positive relationship 
between the age and leverage of the firm. 
Investment and growth opportunities: We include sales growth in previous 
year and capital spending as a share of sales (investment) in the firm valuation 
equation. It is expected that both these variables will exert a positive effect on firm 
value because they proxy for a firm’s growth prospects and investment. Investment 
variable is however dropped from the leverage equation because of the obvious 
simultaneity problem.    
Diversification: A firm is classified as diversified if it operates in more than 
three market segments, each accounting for more than 10% of the total revenue of the 
firm. Unlike Claessens et al. (2002), we include this variable in both equations (1) and 
(2). Diversified firms may enjoy higher profits as a result of combining activities such 
as production, distribution, marketing and research. The transaction cost theory 
(Williamson 1975) and imperfect external capital markets provide a rationale for 
firms to diversify. A different strand of this literature, however, argues that 
diversification has a negative effect on firm performance since diversified firm is 
prone to cross-subsidise investments, poor growth opportunities (Berger and Ofek 
1995) and the distortions in investment decisions can occur in the presence of 
managerial power struggle among the firm's various diversified divisions (Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales 2000). Empirically diversified firms do not appear to perform 
better and the causation tends to run from low performance resulting in a 
diversification of a firm. Inconclusive empirical evidence on this issue also suggests 
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that managers may have objectives other than maximising profits, such as the growth 
of revenue, that lead firms to become diversified. As for capital structure, Lewellen 
(1971) argues that diversified firms enjoy greater debt capacity.  
 
3.2. Simultaneity between Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) argued that firm value and capital structure could be 
closely correlated. This is further clarified in Berger and di Patti (2003). On the one 
hand, high leverage may reduce the agency costs of outside equity, and increase firm 
value by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders.11 On the 
other, there can be reverse causation from firm efficiency/performance to capital 
structure. For example, more efficient firms may choose lower equity ratios than 
others, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of 
bankruptcy and financial distress. More efficient firms may also choose higher equity 
capital ratios, all else equal, to protect the rents or franchise value associated with 
high efficiency from the possibility of liquidation (Berger and di Patti, 2003). While 
the former is known as the efficiency-risk (ER) hypothesis the latter is known as the 
franchise-value (FV) hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of Q in the leverage 
equation would capture the net value of these two possible effects that work in 
opposite directions.  
We also examine if there is any non-linearity in the effects of leverage on firm 
valuation and conversely, that of firm value on leverage in our samples where firm 
value is taken to be a measure of firm efficiency. For example, if leverage is relatively 
                                                
11
 Most existing literature in this area seeks to investigate the relation between profits (internal finance) 
and the choice between debt and equity (external finance). This however tends to be within a single 
equation approach, thus ignoring the potential simultaneity in the determination of profits and leverage. 
This is perhaps surprising when one considers the large literature that is concerned with determining 
the optimal capital structure at the firm level, see for example Rajan and Zingales (1995), or Roberts 
(2002) and the literature discussed therein. 
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high, further increases may generate significant costs including bankruptcy cost and 
thus may lower firm value. Similarly, effects of firm value on leverage could be non-
monotonic; while at lower level of firm value ER could be greater than FV, FV could 
exceed ER at a higher level of firm value. Accordingly, we initially included a square 
Q term in the leverage equation and square leverage term (DA) in the Q equation 
though in the final analysis this turns out to be rather insignificant.12 
  If firm valuation affects the choice of capital structure and vice versa, then the 
failure to take this into account may result in serious simultaneity bias, with important 
implications for pattern of firm financing and valuation. In the light of the two-way 
relationship between capital structure and firm efficiency, we need to allow for the 
simultaneity between capital structure and firm performance. Thus equations (1) and 
(2) are modified as follows: 
itit
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While most variables are included in both equations (3) and (4), there are also some 
identifying variables, i.e., variables that are included in one of these equations only. 
This becomes particularly evident as we introduce simultaneity between leverage and 
profit equations (3) and (4). Thus Qit is included in equation (3) and not in (4); while 
leverage (DA) is included in Q equation (4) only. We also experiment with the square 
                                                
12
 However, in view of the insignificant squared leverage term in the single equation Q estimates, we 
only included the squared Q term in the leverage equation in all the sub-samples (see Table A1-A4). 
There is however no evidence of non-linearity in our sample as the squared Q term remains 
insignificant in the 3SLS estimates across the sub-samples (see Table A2-A4).   
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terms of q in (3) and that of DA in (4);. In addition, the investment variable is only 
included in the firm valuation equation.  
 
3.3. Econometric Considerations 
Given that the ownership information is available only for the year 1996, we could 
construct a cross-section data-set for the period 1996-1998. This would however mean 
a single observation for each firm such that leverage and firm performance relate to 
the average values of these variables for the period while all other variables 
correspond to the initial year 1996. There are at least two disadvantages with this kind 
of data-set. First, the relationship between capital structure and firm performance is 
more pertinent for a given firm over time rather than among the cross-section of the 
firms. Thus a single cross-section cannot capture the aspect of time variation for a 
particular firm. Second, results based on only 1996-98 period are likely to be 
misleading as many firms in these countries were facing the full effects of the crisis. 
Thus by focusing on the crisis period only, we may lose sight of some significant 
behavioural patterns among these Asian corporations. Accordingly, we make use of 
the annual panel data-set for the period 1994-98, which we believe would capture the 
behavioural transition of these corporations better from the pre-crisis years into the 
crisis. 
 An important issue here relates to the potential endogeneity of ownership 
highlighted by Demsetz (1983). In this vein Demsetz and Lehn (1985) used two stage 
least square estimates (treating ownership as potentially endogenous) to suggest that 
ownership has no significant effect on firm performance, which is further confirmed 
by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Cho (1998). On the other hand, Morck et al. 
(1988) among others ignored the issue of endogeneity of ownership structure and 
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produced evidence of a statistically significant effect of ownership structure on 
performance. Given that our ownership information is available only for 1996, we 
assume ownership structure to be exogneously given in our sample (while other 
variables varied across firms as well as over time) for 1994-98 (before post-crisis 
ownership restructuring programme was launched in the sample countries); the latter 
could be supported in the light of La Porta et al. (1999).13 This allows us to focus 
directly on the issues of our interest, i.e., to reinvestigate the effects of ownership 
structure on capital structure and firm valuation, among others, accounting for the 
possible simultaneity between capital structure and firm value. 
Although, we have analytically rationalised the simultaneity between leverage 
and firm value, it is still important to test the hypothesis explicitly. Strictly, this 
involves testing for endogeneity in the variables, using a standard Hausman test. In all 
sub samples, and all models discussed above exogeneity of leverage in Q (equation 4), 
and Q in leverage (equation 3) is rejected. This therefore means that the standard 
“within” panel data determination of capital structure and firm performance, as is 
often reported in the literature is invalid. While it is trivial to correct for the potential 
endogeneity with instrumental variables estimation, a preferred strategy is to jointly 
estimate equations (3) and (4), allowing for simultaneity between capital structure and 
firm valuation. While the use of panel data to estimate systems of simultaneous 
equations is well understood, this generally involves converting the data to differences 
and estimating the system by either three stage least squares (3SLS) or generalised 
methods of moments (GMM) using lagged values as instruments to generate 
orthogonality conditions on differenced data. This is a straightforward simultaneous 
equations estimator following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) or Cornwell et al. (1992), 
                                                
13
 This could further be rationalised in terms of an absence of a market for corporate control in the 
selected countries. 
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which allows for individual effects both within individual equations and in the 
covariance matrix between the equations, based on the more general approach of 
Arrellano and Bond (1988, 1991) or the more recent Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM 
systems estimator. These approaches rely on employing lagged values as instruments; 
so with short panels of unbalanced data such estimation reduces the number of 
observations dramatically. However, the essential problem that we face is that the data 
contain time-invariant variables (e.g., ownership variables). As such, one cannot adopt 
one of these approaches, as differencing the data becomes infeasible. We therefore 
adopt the 3SLS “within” estimation with error components suggested by Baltagi and 
Li (1992), based on Baltagi (1981). In practice this involves estimating equations (3) 
and (4) separately using a standard “within estimator”14 method, and then calculating 
the covariance matrix between the equations using the errors. The data are then 
transformed by dividing through by the square root of the covariance, and finally 
equations (3) and (4) are estimated by 3SLS employing the transformed data.15 As the 
use of 3SLS over 2SLS implies further restrictions in the model, these restrictions can 
be tested again using a standard Hausman F test, and in all cases these restrictions are 
not rejected.  
A final consideration is the issue of stability of coefficients across firms, 
which again is often ignored in this literature. As is outlined above, a high proportion 
of firms in SE Asia are family owned, with high concentrations of voting rights. There 
is however a significant group of firms that do not conform to this pattern. Given the 
                                                
14
 For both equations, random the random effects estimator rejects the restriction of fixed effects in all 
the sample countries. 
15
 Our estimation technique is significantly different from Claessens et al. (2002) who use single 
equation random effects estimates of firm value for pooled data containing firms for all the sample 
countries. With panel data, there is also the concern that the standard errors on some coefficients are 
biased downwards due to correlation across years. The standard “clustering” algorithm is employed to 
allow for this – see for example Petersen (2006). However, in practice the panels used here are 
relatively unbalanced, such that the difference between the clustered and unclustered standard errors is 
small.   
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issues that this paper seeks to address, the relationship between ownership, leverage 
and Tobin’s Q, one must consider whether any model designed to test for this would 
be expected to generate consistent results across these sub-samples. Accordingly, we 
test for this in each of the models that we present below. The hypothesis of uniform 
coefficients across groups is strongly rejected in every case using a standard F test, 
while the individual parameters point to the sources of this instability. A chow test for 
stability of coefficients across groups of firms within each country is presented in the 
tables below. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we present and analyse the 3SLS estimates with error correction for the 
most parsimonious leverage and firm value equations (3) and (4). We start with the 
pooled sample of all firms for individual sample countries.16 However pooling of 
firms under different ownership structures could bias the estimates, especially if these 
firms are managed and controlled differently. Hence, we also compare the estimates 
for all firms with those for family firms with a Cronyman and non-family firms 
without a Cronyman. The proportion of firms in the other two sub groups, namely, 
family firms without a Cronyman and non-family firms with a Cronyman for each 
country are too small for any 3SLS results to be meaningful. Full 3SLS results are 
summarised in Appendix 1 Tables A2-A4 while a summary of results for the effects 
of ownership structure on leverage and firm-valuation is presented in Table 4. One 
                                                
16
 We started with the pooled sample of all firms in the sample countries. However pooling of firms 
under different ownership structures (and controlled and managed differently) could bias the results, 
especially when the nature of the legal/political institutions is different in these countries. The results 
we present illustrate significant differences in the coefficient across countries, such that any model 
attempts to impose uniform coefficients across countries is invalid. 
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can also compare the 3SLS estimates (Appendix Table A2) with the corresponding 
single equations fixed-effects estimates presented (Appendix Table A1) Among other 
things, there is evidence that the single-equation estimates tend to under-estimate the 
effects of firm value on leverage and that of leverage on firm value. Our discussion in 
this section is therefore couched in terms of the 3SLS estimates with error correction 
with specific reference to family firms with a Cronyman (Table A3) and non-family 
firms without a Cronyman (Table A4). 
 
4.1. Effects of ownership structure 
Effects of ownership concentration on leverage and firm valuation seem to differ 
somewhat across the sample countries and also for the particular sub-sample 
(family/non-family firms with/without Cronyman) for a given country. Our discussion 
in this section tends to highlight the distinction between family firms with a 
Cronyman and non-family firms without a Cronyman. It is evident that concentration 
reduces agency conflicts for both groups of firms and tends to maximise firm 
valuation, even after accounting for expropriation of minority shareholders. Effects of 
concentration on leverage however differ between these two groups of firms: higher 
concentration increases leverage in family firms while it tends to lower it among non-
family firms in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Thus there is some support to the 
hypothesis of non-dilution of entrenchment in family firms, while the effect is absent 
among non-family firms. The case of family firms in Thailand seems to be somewhat 
different from the other countries where incentives and risk-aversion effects tend to 
outweigh each other making the overall effect insignificant.17 
                                                
17
 In order to further test the robustness of ownership results, we also estimated an alternative 
specification of (3) and (4), replacing concentration (of cash flow rights among top five shareholders) 
by cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder (see Tables in Appendix 2). In this case, we obtain mixed 
results: effects are similar for Indonesia, but not for Korea and Malaysia and remain insignificant for 
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 Next we analyse the effects of managerial opportunism/moral 
hazard/monitoring (as measured by CEC and CECHIGH)18 on leverage and firm 
valuation. The results presented here suggest that CEC has little impact on leverage 
and firm valuation among non-family firms without a Cronyman while its effects on 
leverage and Q of family firms with a Cronyman are significant. In fact, the latter 
seems to be rather similar to the effects of concentration among these family firms 
with a Cronyman. Higher voting rights (in relation to cash flow rights) among family 
firms with a Cronyman have significantly positive effects on leverage and Q in 
Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia; as before these effects remain insignificant for firms 
in Thailand. The essential implication of these results is that incentive effects among 
family firms tend to dominate, which in turn yield favourable effects of higher control 
than cash flow rights. For non-family firms without a Cronyman, however, effects of 
CEC and CECHIGH are largely insignificant. This suggests that there is effective 
direct and formal monitoring in such firms, which acts to minimise managerial 
opportunism/moral hazard problems. There is also some evidence of non-linearity in 
the effects of monitoring (or lack of it) on leverage and firm performance among 
family firms; the latter is particularly interesting for firms in Thailand. While CEC 
remain insignificant on both leverage and Q among these firms (for both family and 
non-family firms), CECHIGH have significant and negative effects on leverage and 
firm valuation among family firms with a Cronyman in Thailand (the effect remains 
insignificant among non-family firms though). Similar effects are observed among 
                                                                                                                                       
Thailand as before. It is likely that higher cash flow rights of the largest owner (as opposed to top 5 
owners) is associated with greater risk-aversion than incentive effects among the family firms with a 
Cronyman, thus causing negative impact on both leverage and firm value. Note however that these 
results may suffer from the problem of multicollinearity as the cash flow rights of the largest owner 
could be closely correlated with CEC for the largest owner. 
 
18
 In an alternative specification we replace CEC and CECHIGH with control minus cashflow rights 
(CMC) and find rather similar results.  
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family firms with a Cronyman in Malaysia. In other words, higher degree of moral 
hazard (relative to the median level) tends to lower leverage as well as Q among 
family firms in Malaysia and Thailand; this effect is however absent among similar 
firms in Indonesia and Korea.   
 
4.2. Effects of other variables 
There is also some evidence of a significant simultaneity between leverage and firm 
valuation in our samples. Irrespective of the choice of sub-group, higher Q 
significantly lowers relative debt levels in all the sample countries. Similarly, higher 
leverage significantly lowers Q in all the countries. There is however no evidence of 
non-linearity in this respect in any of the sample countries. While only the squared Q 
term was significant in the single equation estimates (Table A1), it remains 
insignificant in the 3SLS estimates for all sub-samples (Table A2-A4).   
Among other variables, degree of diversification appears to be particularly 
important among both family and non-family firms in Thailand; higher rate of 
diversification is associated with higher levels of leverage and firm valuation among 
firms in this country. In general older family firms with Cronyman tend to have 
significantly higher leverage and firm valuation in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
while these effects are opposite in Indonesia. Effects of age are however generally 
small among non-family firms in our sample countries.  
 
 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
While many recent studies have highlighted the role of weak corporate governance in 
the recent Asian crisis (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000, 2002), effects of corporate 
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governance (as reflected in the ownership structure) on both capital structure and firm 
valuation among Asian firms remain much unexplored. The present paper therefore 
attempts to disentangle the complex relationship between ownership structure, on the 
one hand, and capital structure and firm valuation, on the other, among firms in four 
East Asian countries worst affected by the crisis. 
Unlike Claessens et al. (2002), our results tend to vary between the sample 
countries with different institutional/legal institutions and perhaps question the basis 
of pooling of firms in different countries. Secondly, our estimates highlight the 
importance of differentiating the effects of ownership not only from control but also 
from management. Our analysis thus focuses on a distinction between family firms 
with a Cronyman and non-family firms without a Cronyman. While the effects of 
ownership (concentration) on firm value are similar among family and non-family 
firms those on leverage are different; in particular there is evidence of non-dilution of 
entrenchment among family firms as found by Claessens et al. (2002). These two 
groups of firms however behave differently with respect to managerial opportunism as 
measured by the separation of control and cash flow rights. Separation of control from 
cash-flow rights have limited effects on leverage and valuation among non-family 
firms without a Cronyman, while these seem to matter significantly for the family 
firms with a Cronyman. In particular, there is evidence that incentive effects among 
family firms are strong in all the countries except Thailand; however, large difference 
in control and cash flow rights may give rise to entrenchment effects (in excess of 
incentive effects) among Thai family firms with Cronyman.  
If there is one lesson to be learnt from the last Crisis, it is that these 
corporations have become over-reliant on debt, this in part being a function of the 
prevailing ownership structures. One must therefore question whether firms in these 
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countries will be able to maintain their robust patterns of recovery unless they reduce 
their leverage by going directly to capital markets rather than to banks. Of course East 
Asian countries will gain little by dismantling large family owned businesses. What is 
needed at this stage is the strengthening of bank-based corporate governance and 
other legal and judicial reforms that will improve the transparency and accountability 
of these enterprises and better protection of minority shareholders.    
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TABLES 
Table 1. Ownership Structure 
 
Ownership Korea Indonesia Malaysia Thailand 
Cash flow rights of the largest owner 51% 58% 58% 57% 
Average for all firms 17.4% 29.6% 27% 35% 
Average for family firms  18.5% 26.7% 26% 35% 
Average for non-family firms  14% 37% 15% 36% 
     
Family Ownership     
% of total firms with family ownership 79 75 76 61 
 
    
Concentration of ownership     
% of total firms with Concentration     
>50% 6 47 0 0 
25%- 50% 45 50 16 23 
<25% 49 3 84 77 
Highest level of concentration 63% 73% 32% 31% 
     
Cronyman =1     
% total firms 69 69 85 42 
% of family owned firms out of firms with 
cronyman =1 
86 98 89 86 
% of other firms 14 2 11 14 
     
Control exceeds cashflow (CEC)     
% of total firms 25 54 39 12 
% of firms with cronyman =1 out of firms with 
CEC =1 
90 92 94 67 
% of firms with Concen>50% out of firms with 
CEC =1 
8 49 0 0 
% of family firms out of firms with CEC =1 89% 94% 94% 89% 
% of other firms out of firms with CEC =1 11% 6% 6% 11% 
     
% of family firms with CEC=1 and 
Cronyman=1 
91% 100% 98% 100% 
% of non-family firms with CEC=1 and 
Cronyman=1 
9% 0% 2% 0% 
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 Table 2. Effects of ownership structures on leverage and firm performance 
 
 Leverage 
Tobin’s 
Q Leverage 
Tobin’s  
Q Leverage 
Tobin’s  
Q 
 Korea Concentration<25 25<= Concentration >=50 Concentration>50 
1994-96 0.51 0.21 0.47 0.27 0.37 0.34 
1997-98 0.59 0.12 0.54 0.22 0.39 0.32 
  Family firms   Other firms       
1994-96 0.49 0.25 0.46 0.26     
1997-98 0.56 0.18 0.51 0.18     
  CEC=1   CEC =0       
1994-96 0.48 0.26 0.49 0.25     
1997-98 0.57 0.19 0.55 0.17     
  Cronyman=1 Cronyman =0     
1994-96 0.49 0.24 0.47 0.28     
1997-98 0.56 0.18 0.55 0.16     
Indonesia Concentration<25 25<= Concentration >=50 Concentration>50 
1994-96 0.24 0.40 0.38 0.05 0.28 0.50 
1997-98 0.43 0.08 0.65 0.19 0.51 0.32 
  Family firms   Other firms       
1994-96 0.36 ..47 0.29                               0.48     
1997-98 0.61 0.23 0.48 0.30     
  Cronyman =1 Cronyman =0     
1994-96 0.34 0.48 0.28 0.49     
1997-98 0.61 0.23 0.50 0.29     
  CEC=1   CEC =0       
1994-96 0.37 0.47 0.31 0.48     
1997-98 0.63 0.21 0.51 0.28     
Malaysia Concentration<25 25<= Concentration >=50 Concentration>50 
1994-96 0.21 0.51 0.19 0.50 - - 
1997-98 0.35 0.38 0.27 0.50 - - 
  Family firms   Other firms       
1994-96 0.21 0.51 0.21 0.54     
1997-98 0.34 0.42 0.32 0.32     
  Cronyman =1 Cronyman =0     
1994-96 0.19 0.54 0.24 0.55     
1997-98 0.30 0.38 0.36 0.25     
  CEC=1   CEC =0       
1994-96 0.21 0.51 0.20 0.51     
1997-98 0.30 0.48 0.32 0.43     
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 Table 2. (continued)  
 
 Leverage 
Tobin’s 
Q Leverage 
Tobin’s  
Q Leverage 
Tobin’s  
Q 
 Thailand Concentration<25 25<= Concentration >=50 Concentration>50 
1994-96 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.47 - - 
1997-98 0.56 0.26 0.64 0.17 - - 
  Family firms   Other firms       
1994-96 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.43     
1997-98 0.56 0.26 0.41 0.21     
  Cronyman =1 Cronyman =0     
1994-96 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.43     
1997-98 0.59 0.22 0.62 0.16     
  CEC=1   CEC =0       
1994-96 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.45     
1997-98 0.76 -0.06 0.58 0.24     
 
 
Table 3. Model specification 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Dep. Variable 
Leverage  
Dep. Variable 
Q 
Firm size (SALES) 
 

 
Growth of sales (GSALE)   
Age of the firm (AGE) 
 

 
Diversification (DIVER) 
 

 
Capital expenditure (IS) -  
Concentration (CONCEN) 
 

 
Concentration > 50%  - 
Control exceeds cashflow  (CEC)   
Control exceeds cashflow high (CECHigh) 
 
 
Q ratio (Q) 
 
- 
Square of Q (Qsq)  - 
Leverage (TDTA) - 
 
Leverage square (TDTAsq) -  
Cash flow rights of the first owner(CASH1)  (alternative)  (alternative) 
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Table 4A. Summary Statistics  
 
 Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
 Mean Std Dev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean 
Leverage 0.47911 0.29200 0.52120 0.26861 0.26840 0.36528 0.47391 
Firm value Q 0.35008 0.31135 0.22137 0.33338 0.46079 0.59410 0.34800 
Firm size 225.99228 460.3315 1659.754 4091.887 368.73532 649.26434 236.4176 
Growth of sales -0.27975 0.85491 13.77369 28.08173 1.10957 0.68242 1.20406 
Age of the firm 25.16822 15.04544 32.89511 12.94478 28.75952 17.32579 22.45253 
Investment share 0.74498 1.98248 0.83296 2.83325 0.53313 1.59104 1.66979 
Diversificatiobn 0.28660 0.45288 0.35776 0.47969 0.55311 0.49767 0.19620 
Concentration (%) 47.64486 9.90699 26.72135 12.23322 18.08016 5.96657 19.87975 
Concentration>50% 26.71340 28.08745 3.07967 12.87189 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
CEC 0.64798 0.47835 0.66810 0.47123 0.81764 0.38653 0.63924 
CECHIGH 0.48598 0.50058 0.52155 0.49989 0.48898 0.50038 0.42089 
Cash flow rights of 
the largest owner 
29.56075 13.42259 17.83190 9.46917 26.76954 12.21778 34.79051 
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Table 4B. Effects of ownership structure on leverage and firm valuation:  
              A  summary of results 
 
Variables Country All firms Family firms 
with a 
Cronyman 
Non-family 
firms without a 
Crony 
  Leverage Q Leverage Q Leverage Q 
Concentration Indo + * + * + * + * - * + * 
 Korea + * + * + * + * - * + * 
 Malaysia + * + * + * + * + * + * 
 Thailand + + + - - * - * 
        
CEC Indo + * + * + * + * - * + * 
 Korea + * + * + * + * - + 
 Malaysia + * + * + * + * + + 
 Thailand + + - - - - 
        
CECHIGH Indo +  +  - - - + 
 Korea + * + * + + + * + * 
 Malaysia -* -* - * - * - - 
 Thailand - * - * - * - * - + 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1. Single equation estimates of leverage and firm value, all firms 
 
 Indonesia  KOREA  MALAYSIA THAILAND 
Dependent variable: leverage
       
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Firm size -00000300 -0.82 -000000159 -0.60 -0000629 -2.75** --0000039 -1.76* 
Firm value -0.4174 -17.86** -0.2700 -7.62** -0.7539 -19.87** -0.9381 -44.30** 
Firm value square -0.1724 -3.80** 0.0680 5.54** -0.0572 -10.79** -0.0666 -9.77** 
Growth of sale -0.0124 -0.98 .0000000245 .0000991 .00044 0.30 .00046 1.83* 
Firm age .000124 0.70 .000276 3.54** .000103 1.23 -0000254 -0.30 
Diversification 0.0664 1.33 .000468 0.22 -0.0317 -1.12 -0.0174 -0.54 
Concentration .000279 0.72 .0000737 0.73 -.000059 -0.25 .000351 1.58* 
Concentration>50% -.000151 -1.06 -.0000351 -0.39     
CEC -0.0658 -2.45** -0.0105 -0.48 -0.0288 -0.96 .0000801 0.07 
CECHIGH 0.0907 2.01** .0000283 0.01 -0.0507 -2.18** -.000914 -0.90 
Intercept 0.5911 3.54** 0.4774 9.25** 0.6989 10.36** 0.7304 11.42** 
R-sq 0.366131  0.8493  0.6499  0.8167  
AR(1) (p value) 1.295(0.254)  1.074(0.300)  1.562(0.2114)  1.995(0.1578)  
SSR 25.9740  26.1321  8.74349  3.1829  
Dependent variable: Firm value 
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Firm size .0000000232 .00061 -.000000649 -1.98** -.0000066 -1.99** -.0000038 -1.29 
Leverage -0.4387 -16.98** -0.6314 -15.82** -1.1255 -20.55** -1.2235 -63.59** 
Growth of sale -0.0234 -1.59* .0000862 2.73** 0.0266 0.94 .000391 0.96 
Diversification -0.0251 -0.46 -0.0156 -0.60 -0.0472 -1.19 -0.0114 -0.30 
Firm age -.000104 -0.55 .0000896 0.92 .0000668 0.58 .0000413 0.41 
Concentration .000542 1.31 .000422 3.42** -.000421 -1.24 .000375 1.44 
Concentration>50% .0000204 0.13 -.000160 -1.44*     
CEC 0.1279 4.95** 0.0803 2.94** 0.1123 1.98** -0.0244 -1.54* 
CEChigh -0.0643 -1.32 -7.00008 -0.03 -0.0784 -1.80* -6.00002 -0.40 
Investment share  0.0118 1.56* 0.0108 2.79** .000983 0.85 .0000324 0.46 
Intercept 0.2007 1.10 0.2902 4.33** 0.7777 7.73** 0.8184 10.88** 
R-sq (adj) 0.9643 0.3662 0.5642 0.9023 
AR(1) 3.214 (0.073) 3.078 (0.079) 3.198 (0.0737) 3.450 (0.063) 
SSR 36.0421 19.0818 12.7568 2.6800 
Observations(firms) 321 (91) 656 (162) 493 (129) 287 (70) 
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Table A2. 3SLS estimates of leverage and firm valuation, all firms 
 
 Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 0.7253 25.35** 0.6404 50.04** 0.4793 22.53** 0.5963 32.15** 
Firm size -.000000846 -3.01** -.000000036 -2.54** 
-
.0000000963 -1.96* .0000247 1.69* 
Diversification .000158 0.73 .000126 1.87* -.00000646 -0.92 .000207 2.73** 
Firm age .0000196 0.24 -.0000168 -0.72 .0000523 2.02** 5.000008 1.41 
Firm value -0.0567 -35.03** -0.0477 -21.58** -0.0302 -8.88** -0.0160 -17.07** 
Firm value square .0000000591 .0000584 .000122 0.22 .000148 0.58 -.000196 -0.81 
Growth of sale -.0000155 -0.12 3.0000005 0.34 .000101 1.41 -.0000161 -0.55 
Concentration .0000170 1.66* .0000137 4.10* .0000386 7.19** .000005172 1.04 
Concentration>50% .00000118 0.20 -.00000626 -1.65*     
CEC .00074 3.65** .000232 2.68* .000469 3.69** .000088 0.81 
CECHIGH .0000164 0.08 .00022 2.86** -.000191 -2.42** -.000489 -9.40** 
R-sq (adj) 0.3564  0.7024  0.5981  0.4014  
AR (1) 2.003(0.157)  1.65 (0.199)  1.585(0.208)  2.484(0.115)  
Sargan (p-value) 0.255  0.231  0.247  0.186  
SSR 37.3243  39.0018  39.5117  10.1496  
 Firm Value equation     
Intercept 12.7873 19.42** 13.387 15.15** 16.2059 11.34** 34.052 9.63** 
Firm size -1.00006 -3.02** -.000000755 -2.77** -.00000338 -2.07** .0000148 1.66* 
Leverage -17.6304 -30.33** -20.8952 -15.59** -33.855 -13.66** -57.0457 -9.64** 
Growth of sales -.0027 -0.12 .00000787 0.39 0.0353 1.47* -.000943 -0.53 
Firm age .0000346 0.24 -.0000421 -0.94 .000191 2.22** .000356 1.45* 
Diversification 0.0279 0.73 0.0269 2.07** -0.0257 -1.10 0.1167 2.60** 
Concentration .000300 1.66* .000288 5.60** 0.0132 8.06** .000301 1.01 
Concentration>50% .0000208 0.20 -.000130 -1.79*     
CEC  0.1306 3.70** 0.0482 2.88** 0.1593 4.08** 0.0624 0.92 
CECHIGH .000290 0.08 0.047096 3.22** -0.0646 -2.42** -0.2912 -12.47** 
Investment share -.0000017 -0.02 .000166 1.57* .0000753 0.12 -.0000128 -0.21 
R2 (adj) 0.7726  0.6825  0.7783  0.8619  
AR(1), 2.722(0.100)  2.613(0.106)  2.003(0.157)  2.366(0.124)  
Sargan. 0.314  0.288  0.241  0.299  
SSR 51.20  21.256  28.13  17.5647  
Observations (firms) 321 (91)  656 (162)    287 (70)  
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Table A3. 3SLS estimates of leverage and firm valuation, Family firms with Cronyman 
   
 Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  
Leverage equation 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 0.7875 21.99** 0.6933 34.29** 0.4581 19.93** 0.6368 18.47** 
Firm size -.00000068 -1.68* -.000000022 -1.33 -.000000133 -2.73** .000000333 0.70 
Diversification .000380 1.18 -.0000279 -0.23 -.0000249 -0.34 .000572 2.09** 
Firm age -.0000357 -2.35** .00000791 2.26** .00000966 3.58** .00000604 0.88 
Firm value -0.0828 -27.48** -0.0664 -9.92** -0.0357 -7.97** -0.0166 -5.45** 
Firm value square -.00000112 -.000532 .000728 0.49 .000431 1.22 -.00059 -0.89 
Growth of sales .000113 0.48 -.00000829 -3.03** .0000749 1.01 .000175 1.28 
Concentration .0000422 3.46** .0000103 2.33** .0000387 6.72** -.0000240 -1.21 
Concentration>50% -.000001 -0.73 -.00001 -0.25     
CEC .000867 3.05** .000470 2.64** .000635 4.45** -.0000282 -0.14 
CECHIGH -.000299 -1.08 .0000256 0.17 -.000153 -1.88* -.000516 -5.39** 
R2 (adj) 0.800  0.6214  0.607   0.51 
AR(1) 2.135(0.144)  0.8172(0.366)  0.9663(0.325)   0.70(0.40) 
Sargan. 0.301  0.258  0.243   0.20 
SSR 29.81  17.54  30.20   5.23 
Firm value equation 
Intercept 9.5135 16.44** 10.7932 11.71** 13.4114 9.63** 29.8499 6.40** 
Firm size -.00000817 -1.69* -.00000042 -1.54* -.00000435 -3.01** .0000211 0.90 
Leverage -12.0803 -23.99** -15.5113 -11.63** -29.4037 -11.49** -46.7103 -6.33** 
Growth of sale 0.01368 0.48 -.000125 -3.39** 0.0253 1.15 0.1075 1.51* 
Firm age -.000431 -2.38** .0001 2.15** .000331 4.25** .000342 0.10 
Diversification 0.0459 1.18 -.000449 -0.27 -0.0151 -0.69 0.2775 1.91* 
Concentration .0000509 3.51** .000168 2.84** 0.0116 7.52** -0.0123 -1.19 
Concentration>50% -.0000729 -0.73 -.0000325 -0.35     
CEC 0.1047 3.13** 0.0720 3.04** 0.1875 5.03** -0.0181 -0.18 
CECHIGH -0.0361 -1.10 2.0004 0.12 -0.0481 -1.95* -0.2585 -5.93** 
Investment share  .0000081 0.06 .000262 2.39** .000541 0.43 -.000203 -0.21 
R2 (adj) 0.921  0.8813  0.890  0.899  
AR(1) 1.199(0.273)  1.553(0.2127)  2.163 (0.141)  2.009(0.156)  
Sargan. 0.255  0.299  0.102  0.095  
SSR 8.73  10.32  18.4  12.25  
Observations (firms) 234 (66)  507 (125)  394 (103)  178 (47)  
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Table A4. 3SLS estimates of leverage and firm valuation, non-family firms without Cronyman 
 
 Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand 
Leverage Equation 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 0.8558 9.79** 0.5345 25.44** 0.5731 7.24** 0.6027 18.68** 
Firm size -.0000043 -1.77* .0000000432 1.38 -.0000014 -2.05** .000000845 1.47* 
Diversification 0.014979 1.57* .0000897 0.76 -.0000096 -.000173 0.0103 2.64** 
Firm age -.0000189 -0.50 .00000399 0.42 .0000142 0.52 .0000347 2.96** 
Firm value 0.1348 2.44** -0.0448 -3.53** -0.1216 -7.48** -0.0428 -9.87** 
Firm value square -0.0318 -0.58 0.0101 0.40 .00000453 .000302 -.0000518 -0.14 
Growth of sale -.0000127 -0.03 .00000368 1.43 -.000238 -0.66 .000377 1.29 
Concentration -.0000857 -1.78* .0000127 1.89* 3.0004 3.49** -.000377 -1.63* 
Concentration>50% .0000258 0.7849 -.0000127 -0.90     
CEC -0.0228 -2.9635** -.000102 -0.48 0.0100 0.51 -.000152 -0.59 
CECHigh -0.0164 -1.4196 .000284 2.98** -.000371 -0.83 .00011     0.45 
R2 (adj) 0.5921  0.6621  0.4452  0.491  
AR(1), 1.556(0.212)  1.699(0.1924)  1.477(0.224)  1.329(0.249)  
Sargan. 0.155  0.2234  0.2255  0.2336  
SSR 10.258  4.26  2.905  2.907  
Firm value equation 
Intercept -5.6691 -3.31** 9.0591 3.96** 4.6496 4.74** 14.0028 7.11** 
Firm size .0000238 1.29 .000000326 0.47 -.000011 -2.08** .0000198 1.48* 
Leverage 6.2344 2.68** -16.7799 -4.00** -8.0953 -5.88** -23.2147 -7.38** 
Growth of sale .0000312 0.01 .00000706 1.70* -0.0189 -0.68 0.0875 1.37 
Firm age .0000441 0.17 .000100 0.63 .000121 0.58 .0000805 3.06** 
Diversification -0.0945 -1.35 0.0106 0.54 -.000500 -0.01 0.2386 2.80 
Concentration .000596 2.36** .000288 2.79** 0.0274 4.28** -.00072 -1.71* 
Concentration>50% -.0000914 -0.43 -.000205 -0.65     
CEC 0.1869 4.15** .000551 0.15 0.0818 0.54 -0.0341 -0.58 
CECHigh 0.0912 0.97 0.0693 5.02** -0.0309 -0.91 0.0258 0.45 
Investment share  0.0406 1.14 .000992 1.20 .0000627 0.25 .0000341 0.04 
R2 (adj) 0.709  0.4726  0.726  0.864  
AR(1), 1.533 
(0.216)  
2.087 
(0.1486)  
2.399 
(0.121)  
2.877 
(0.090)  
Sargan. 0.2117  0.2339  0.1008  0.1087  
SSR 12.365  6.51  4.39  4.59  
Observations (firms) 87 (25)  149 (37)  99 (26)  109 (23)  
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Appendix 2 
3SLS estimates of leverage and firm valuation, family firms with cronyman 
Alternative estimates using cash flow rights of the largest shareholder 
 
 Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand  
Leverage equation
 
Parameter Estimate t-stat Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 0.7431 20.69** 0.6470 35.85** 0.4245 18.50** 0.6063 18.73** 
Firm size -.000000706 -1.70* -.0000000279 -1.34 -.00000014 -2.68** 3.0000004 0.70 
Diversification .000357 1.14 -.0000299 -0.23 -.0000246 -0.34 .000551 1.97** 
Firm age -.0000336 -2.19** .00000836 2.22** .0000101 3.66** .00000567 0.86 
Firm value 0.0859 -26.49** -0.0634 -9.87** -0.0336 -8.27** -0.0162 -5.68** 
Firm value square -.00000120 -.00050 .000705 0.45 .000442 1.19 -.000552 -0.92 
Growth of sales .000117 0.46 -.00000809 -2.86** .0000748 1.06 .000167 1.24 
Cash flow rights of 
the largest owner 
.000319 3.01** -.000146 -2.48** .000104 0.56 -.0000893 -1.07 
CEC .000839 2.86** .000494 2.61** .000659 4.49** -.0000278 -0.14 
CECHIGH -.000297 -1.03 .0000242 0.16 -.000152 -1.90* -.000551 -5.67** 
R2 (adj) 0.758  0.591  0.588  0.48  
AR(1), 2.057 (0.052)  0.857 (0.355)  1.009(0.315)  0.699 (0.403)  
Sargan. 0.355  0.266  0.243  0.222  
SSR 30.56  19.62  33.47  5.77  
Firm value equation 
Intercept 9.0773 17.55** 10.9305 12.03** 13.3329 10.27** 27.8405 6.42 
Firm size -.00000805 -1.58* -.000000403 -1.43* -.00000438 -2.82** .0000210 0.93 
Leverage -11.3766 -24.17** -15.1259 -11.19** -30.1295 -11.00** -45.3502 -6.31** 
Growth of sale 0.01359 0.48 -.000127 -3.18** 0.0260 1.14 0.1034 1.58* 
Firm age -.000456 -2.40 .000105 2.25** .000327 4.22** .000324 0.99 
Diversification 0.0473 1.19 -4.27E-03 -0.25 -0.0141 -0.72 0.2698 1.80* 
Cash flow rights of 
the largest owner 
.00240 3.08** -.00527 -2.15** -0.0443 -2.06** -0.0317 -1.10 
CEC 0.1067 3.28** 0.07427985 3.16** 0.1963 4.66** -0.0180 -0.19 
CECHIGH -0.0339 -1.13 .000232 0.12 -0.0476 -1.98* -0.2566 -6.17** 
Investment share .00000769 0.06 .00054 2.44** .000506 0.41 -.000216 -0.22 
R2 (adj) 0.920  0.882  0.894  0.880  
AR(1), 1.232(0.267)  1.541(0.215)  2.104 (0.147)  2.026(0.155) 
 
Sargan. 0.235  0.291  0.096  0.099  
SSR 8.62  10.07  18.35  12.50  
Observations (firms) 234 (66)  507 (125)  394(103)  178 (47)  
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3SLS estimates of leverage and firm valuation, non-family firms without Cronyman 
 
 Indonesia  KOREA  Malaysia  THAILAND 
Leverage equation
 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 0.7971 10.68** 0.5085 27.12** 0.6277 6.39** 0.623549 17.11** 
Firm size -.0000042 -1.96* .0000000483 1.45 -.0000015 -2.13** .000000831 1.63 
Diversification 0.0159 1.55* 0.0009 0.85 -.0000087 -0.00 0.010206 2.43** 
Firm age -0.0002 -0.54 .00000402 0.41 0.0001 0.52 0.000367 3.22** 
Firm value 0.12167 2.51** -0.0457 -3.95** -0.1399 -7.37** -0.04479 -11.35** 
Firm value square -0.0307 -0.54 0.0110 0.36 .00000395 0.00 -0.0005 -0.12 
Growth of sale -0.0001 -0.03 .0000037 1.62 -0.0023 -0.57 0.003834 1.44 
Cash flow rights of the largest owner -0.0026 -0.62 0.0015 2.61** 0.0013 2.56** -0.00094 -1.26* 
CEC -0.0237 -2.65** -0.0009 -0.44 0.009911 0.58 -0.00148 -0.64 
CECHIGH -0.0157 -1.33 0.0025 2.76** -0.0041 -0.95 0.001174 0.48 
R2 (adj) 0.555  0.678  0.424  0.486  
AR(1), 1.548(0.213)  1.713 (0.191)  1.425(0.232)  1.358(0.244)  
Sargan. 0.188  0.228  0.261  0.208  
SSR 10.99  4.09  3.08  3.05  
Firm value equation
         
Intercept -5.2432 -3.53** 9.2495 4.15** 4.5737 4.72** 15.30478 7.86** 
Firm size 0.0003 1.30 .000000323 0.45 -0.0001 -1.81** 0.000195 1.54* 
Leverage 6.7917 2.79** -16.3502 -4.30** -8.3382 -6.55** -21.1376 -7.74** 
Growth of sale 0.0003 0.01 0.0008 1.95* -0.0169 -0.65 0.081981 1.28 
Firm age 0.0005 0.16 0.0011 0.55 0.0013 0.64 0.008441 3.14** 
Diversification -0.1079 -1.27 0.0113 0.62 -0.0054 -0.01 0.207818 3.19** 
Cash flow rights of the largest owner 0.0153 0.41 0.0480 -2.20** 0.0488 1.94* -0.03109 -1.23 
CEC 0.1968 4.74** 0.0055 0.14 0.0865 0.62 -0.03814 -0.53 
CECHIGH 0.0925 1.08 0.0608 5.60** -0.0284 -0.86 0.023885 0.44 
Investment share 0.0405 1.19 0.0114 1.27 0.0006 0.27 0.000378 0.044 
R2 (adj) 0.687  0.471  0.687  0.855  
AR(1), 1.472(0.225)  2.037 (0.154)  2.328(0.127)  2.847(0.092) 
 
Sargan. 0.186  0.258  0.107  0.110  
SSR 13.68  6.62  4.66  4.89  
Observations (firms) 87 (25)  149 (37)  99 (26)  109 (23)  
 
